Friday, December 16, 2011

Passing the Buck

Film review: Eight Men Out
Directed by: John Sayles
(1988)

Pure and simple, this film is great fun. It feels light on its feet, shuffling swiftly from World Series day games, to a behind-the-scenes build up of the sloppily conceived scandal, and back to the ballpark. And it always seems to travel in pairs. The entire cast just dances along together, and the joy is infectious. Dealing out their lines with either a knowing smirk or a nervous twitch, the audience can feel the game is rigged. At first, this casual film seems small-fry on the surface, but Sayles manages to sneak in several clever and subtle motifs to enhance the legendary story of the 1919 Black Sox scandal to the level of epic tragedy - or comedy, depending on how you respond to it.

A pair of small-potato, potential World Series fixers (played with screwball charm by Christopher Lloyd and Richard Edson), are seen in the stands speculating on which of the White Sox starters might be susceptible to their scheme. Later, they approach a money man - Abe Attell - who runs rackets for the big cheese in Chi-town - Arnold Rothstein - with their idea to fix the Fall Classic. Attell can dig it, but when he presents it to the boss, Rothstein says no. Attell decides to finance the small-timers anyway while taking a huge cut for himself.

First baseman Chick Gandil also conceives of fixing the Series while meeting with Boston's own heavy better - Sport Sullivan (who ironically gets the go-ahead from Rothstein himself) - and rationalizes that everybody will be a winner if they fix it together, so he'll gladly get the boys on board. Sullivan is surprised to hear how easy it'll be to convince seven players from the best team in the world to flop for a simple chunk of change. "You never played for Charles Comiskey," Gandil says with disgust.

His partner on the diamond, shortstop Swede Risberg, seems especially comfortable with the idea of a conspiracy. However, the top two starting pitchers, Eddie Cicotte and Lefty Williams, prove much harder to persuade. Without this pair of aces, there's no way the White Sox could intentionally lose the Series to the inferior Reds of Cincinnati. Yet, after Comiskey famously withholds a well-deserved bonus for Cicotte, he, too, figures to finally get his share.

Second baseman Eddie "College Boy" Collins and catcher Ray Schalk are the incorruptible couple; they're not even invited to the secret team meetings. The only infielder left to convince, then, is third baseman Buck Weaver (played perfectly by John Cusack - earnest, naive, and tragic, in turns). But both he and coach Kid Gleason seem so genuinely flabbergasted at the very idea of playing anything but honest baseball (although Buck knows of the fix and Gleason should've known) that we soon learn Buck can't be corrupted either.

A pair of knucklehead outfielders, Happy Felsch and Shoeless Joe, are perceived as the "dumb and dumber" of the American League and are thus easily strongarmed into the charade. (That Felsch is played by the raucous Charlie Sheen now gives the film cultish potentiality). There's plenty of pathos here (Shoeless Joe can't read and is therefore powerless outside the diamond) and cheap laughs are had on their behalf, but there's some real poetry to their play.

Third-sacker Buck Weaver plays a similarly idyllic hot corner with real tenacity (apparently Cusack was coached by recent HOF inductee Ron Santo during the film) and trademark childlike smile, spending his on-screen time off the diamond playing stick ball in alleyways with the neighborhood kids. But of course he's also playing in a figurative hot corner, as Buck finds himself in on the secret, but unwilling to comply with the fix. He stomachs the deceit, plays hard, and impulsively berates his teammates for their deliberately bad play, as if the demands of the game to play properly right now transcend all other agreements, circumstances, or realities. Only zen masters, monkeys, and childlike ballplayers are capable of such dedication to immediate play.


 Buck Weaver, 1913


A pair of reporters - the proverbial Greek chorus (played by a wonderfully smarmy Studs Terkel and with corpse-like solemnity by director John Sayles) - are hot on their trail, noting the instances of fishy fuck-ups and bonehead blunders committed by what some believed, at the time, to be the greatest team they'd ever seen.

As we know by now, the Sox lost the Series in eight (!) games, then got exposed by these reporters, and were eventually indicted for conspiring to throw the Series.

However, most people forget that these immensely popular players were found not guilty by the Chicago jury. But it didn't matter to Kenesaw Mountain Landis - newly appointed commish and totalitarian dictator of baseball. He promptly banned all players for life, as we're often reminded of every time another scandal emerges in baseball or each time we come across Field of Dreams.

So it's home to their families, to their farms, to their ignominious ends. The newly dubbed Black Sox faded into the fabric of American legend. All except for Buck Weaver, who campaigned tirelessly to have his name cleared and his reputation restored so he could return to the game he never could let go of. He was denied and ignored, and he died at 65. At the end of the film, Buck is shown five years after his expulsion watching some bush-league game in Hoboken with a crowd of young men murmuring about the rightfielder, who looks an awful lot like Shoeless Joe. Of course it's him, but Buck assures them "all those players are gone."

The cynic would say Buck only set himself up to be the sap, keeping mum, and believing his teammates would turn the corner and play on the level - or, in the end, believing in some sense of fairness in the baseball hierarchy. But Buck Weaver is clearly a tragic character. It wasn't so much the corruptibility of his fellow teammates -- The Southside Seven -- but the contemptuousness of organized crime, and ultimately of organized baseball itself (embodied in tight-asses Comiskey and Landis) that set him up as the tragic hero of the film. The childlike way in which he played both an ebullient and stalwart Series on such an uneven playing field, combined with his desperate pleas for latter-day absolution, simply puts to rest any doubt of the tragic nature to Buck Weaver's life in baseball.

To be honest, I found Eight Men Out (the film) to be even more enjoyable than Eliot Asinov's detailed, engrossing, but poorly-paced 1963 book by the same name (8 Men Out). Hell, it's the best baseball film I've seen.

Yet.

Friday, December 9, 2011

Ups and Downs, Rox and Browns

With the Face of the Franchise now stolen away from both the Mets and Cardinals, the slick crooks of Little Havana and Disneyland are shamelessly vomiting out hundreds of millions of dollars for each their own southpaw starter. Not content to have raped Queens of her star, Miami ripped the soul out of the southside and stole away Mark Buehrle (he of the Perfect Game), while the crowds in L.A. coo at C.J. Wilson's decision to play for his hometown.

But what's new here in the BULLPEN?  Well, here's one headline:

CUBS AND ROCKIES SWAP FAILURES

The Rox finally disposed of another pasty white lug who couldn't man the hot-corner. But I haven't seen anything out of Colvin to make me think he's any better of a player than Stewart, except for that video on mlb of him legging out a triple (at least he looks faster than oafish Ian). The Cubs also get righthanded reliever Casey Weathers in the deal, who I barely remember even hearing about last season. But apparently the Rox brass is blaring loudest about acquiring this DJ LaMaheiu fella (sounds ridiculously Smooth Jazz Radiojockeyish), apparently another infielder to add to the merry-go-round.

With Herrera, Nelson, EY Jr, and LaMeheiu all undoubtedly inadequate in some ways or others, it's looking like the platoon-horny schmucks in charge don't mind prolonging mediocrity and destroying the careers of decent young infielders by turning them into schizophrenic failures, unable to grow some cajones and get beyond their collective performance anxiety. Shoot, the same probably goes for our third outfielder, too. Whomever he may be.


*                    *                    *


Out in the deep green grass of Coors roams the long-legged doe, Dexter Fowler, still green himself, but with the potential to be one of the best centerfielders in the sport. He's also expected to have a breakout season offensively. For real this time. But unless Jim Tracey gets him out of the leadoff spot and back to the 2-hole where he's most comfortable, there's gonna be some seriously disappointed fans in Denver.

Carlos "The Little Pony" Gonzalez can play anywhere and make it look easy. The dude loves to dive and slide and flash the leather, as much as he enjoys showing off that powerfully smooth swing. The Little Pony of the national league could make a run at MVP again, now that expectations have been tempered.

But the story of the third outfielder has been a woeful tale for the Rockies over the past several years. Watching Brad Hawpe shrivel from an All-Star rightfielder into an incompetent firstbaseman for the Padres, Rox fans have to wonder if we can really expect anything better from the Seth Smith, Ryan Spilborghs, and/or Tyler Colvin trio. Why not deal these players for pitching, and bring up Wheeler or Blackmon again?


*                    *                   *


Let's get the ball back into the infield. Although it'd be nice to snag Martin Prado, I think better value lurks with Placido Polanco. He was forgettably brilliant last May (.398, 10/5 BB/K, 19 RBI), and always wins a gold glove no matter where he plays (2B in 2009, 3B in 2010), plus he never strikes out. So add another veteran goldglover in the infield with Tulo and Helton -- likely the best defenders at their respective positions in all of baseball -- then simply start the best glove of the four platooners from above (at either 3B or 2B).  That sounds solid enough to challenge the '07 Rockies for the best team fielding percentage record in the history of the major leagues! (Lest we forget those glory days).

But what about the Rockies of today? Make no mistake, the Rox have been active this off-season. Active like somebody who insecurely keeps himself busy all the time in order to appear hard at work. They stupidly released a very valuable closer in Huston Street. And smartly cut Wigginton, just for the hell of it. They saved a tiny bit of money on the Iannetta/Hernandez flip. And for whatever reason, signed an undesirable, flyball-inducing innings-eater, Kevin Slowey. That still leaves a lot of money to get an Ace. And an Ace we need, oh-so-badly, ever since we traitorously traded Ubaldo.

Well, CJ Wilson went to Disneyland with Whinnie the Pujols, so there's only one Ace left out there.
It's the highly coveted Yu Darvish.
This is it, Rox. Your last chance.
This guy's numbers are no fluke.

Check it out, it's the Stat of the Week


Alas, we all know the emptyheaded Monforts are cheap bastards and there's no way in hell the Rockies could ever muster enough sophistication and/or foresight to pull this one off. Not as long as these same twisted minds are still in control. Given their history of terrible pitching contracts and the discriminatory practices of their more recent past, would it surprise anyone if the Rockies were reticent to go after Japaense-Iranian Yu Darvishsefad as opposed to simply "trusting" in dudes like Alex White, Drew Pomeranz, and Christian Friedrich (suspiciously Jeff Franciscan in his underwhelmingness) -- who stunk it up in Double-A last year (6-10, 5.00 ERA, 1.49 WHIP)? One thing has become clear over the years. Despite a consistently full Coors field, the old white men at the top only care about augmenting their own wealth, like every other jerk in the 1% -- to use the parlance of our times.

Thus, dear friends, with all your typical major league b.s. continuing to give Baseball a bad name, it may be time once again (after this season, of course) to abandon the mlb, and, in the meantime, to get to know the local amateur team, the Denver Browns, in time for my spring visit back home.







Friday, December 2, 2011

Moneyball, Epstein, and the Cubs

Chicago

After a memorable October Classic – intriguing for the opposing managing styles of the two clubs, bizarre for the number of little league blunders committed by both sides, and exciting for its unlikely lead changes throughout – we’re finally past November and settling in for the arrival of The Hawk, as winter is known around these parts.

Baseball’s return to the North and South sides is quite a few page-flips ahead in the calendar, and city sport fans seem content pondering the improved fortunes of their beloved Bears (it’s the offensive line, if you ask me). And yet, perhaps for the unseasonable warmth and sunshine we've had, or maybe with the NBA away settling its absurd labor dispute, baseball doesn’t feel that far away. At least not for Cub fans.

The hiring of President Theo Epstein and, to a much lesser extent, manager Dale Sveum has created a stir, and local papers continue to provide a steady stream of news about the Northsiders, even if the tidbits are relegated to the final pages of the sports section.

Who the hell is Theo Epstein, and what does he have to offer the Cubs?

At first glance Epstein is just another upper-tier, baseball executive: white bread, Ivy League, highly paid, essentially bland and inoffensive to eye or ear. He does stand out for being relatively young – in fact, he became the youngest GM in MLB history in 2002 when the Red Sox hired him at the ripe age of 28. But why?

Epstein’s brand of baseball, as popularized in the book-come-movie Moneyball, seems to represent a paradigm shift in managerial thinking. In many ways, it's a story that illustrates the differences between theory and practice, with the former represented by sabermetrics pioneer Bill James, and the latter personified by the likes of Oakland A’s GM Billy Beane and Epstein. (Full disclosure: When it comes to mathematics, I have trouble grasping anything beyond long division, and I am thus incapable of comprehending, let alone explaining, the more technical aspects of James’ statistical… innoventions. I will, however, drop James’ name and ideas shamelessly throughout the present and future posts.)

We can imagine James the theoretician, on duty as a night watchman at a pork and beans factory in the late ‘70s, hunched over a desk, pouring over piles of box scores and baseball stats, dreaming up new ways to answer a very simple question: what is it that makes one team score more runs than another? (Hearing about night watchman James immediately conjures up Einstein in his younger years, which he spent working at a Swiss patent office while moonlighting with his theory of relativity). Unconvinced by traditional baseball stats, James looked to previously unquantifiable aspects of the game to come up with categories like runs created (runs a player helps create, as well as a team’s projected number of runs), range factor (defensive ability, quantified), and even something cool called a “Pythagorean Winning Percentage.” It goes without saying that fame and fortune did not come overnight to the statistician, but as players' salaries continued to climb to astronomical heights in the decades that followed, his quantitative approach to the game would soon be not only theoretically intriguing, but a financial necessity for front office staffs.

Perhaps James, much like your average fantasy league nerd, simply relished in assembling imaginary squads of speedy hitters with sky-high on-base percentages who would consistently outscore their opponents. Was it merely intellectual curiosity and a passion for the game which drove him to compile his lengthy Baseball Abstracts?

Whatever his original motivations may have been, the practical applications of sabermetrics would not materialize until the early 2000s, when Billy Beane’s small market A’s lost key players to wealthier clubs. Unable to compete with the salaries offered up by the East Coast oligarchs, Beane brought in a young Yale grad and sabermetrician to help rebuild his team by assembling a collection of overlooked veterans, rookies, and would-be wash-ups – who were willing to play for peanuts compared to, say, a newly pinstriped (and bloated) Jason Giambi.

In short: sabermetrics, when put into practice by baseball management, ceases to be a theoretical exercise in assessing players and projecting winners, and becomes yet another example of capitalism's streamlining, wage-repressing logic. Which is not to say that professional baseball players have anything in common with South Asian textile laborers. The fact that the Cubbies are about to dole out $20 million next season to the likes of Carlos Zambrano is enough to make anyone's stomach turn – especially mine.

Which brings us back to Chicago. It will indeed be interesting to see what Epstein has in store for Wrigleyville in 2012. As far as intangibles go, he's proven himself a winner for bad luck clubs by breaking the so-called Curse of the Bambino and bringing two World Series trophies to Beantown. To be sure, Boston classifies as a big market team and has the payroll to match, but Epstein's initial approach was indeed inspired by Beane's success in Oakland (Incidentally, Beane turned down the job in Boston in 2002 before it was offered to young Epstein).

Interestingly, though, a number of other clubs have since gone Moneyball, which means that, thanks to simple supply and demand, previously overlooked players with high on-base and slugging percentages are now worth more than they were a decade ago. As a result, Moneyball has expanded to take a number of defensive categories into account, and each team's front office has its own means of rating a player's defensive performance. As Peter Gammons reported while Epstein was still in Boston: "The Red Sox have their own service that charts games, including how hard balls are hit. 'It goes beyond zone ratings,' says. 'We try to measure players by what the average defensive player at that position would get to.'" (http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/gammons/story?id=1880247)

Exactly how Epstein tackles the Cub dilemma is anybody's guess at this point. Will he go young, fast and unpredictable? Proven, solid and dull? Flashy and overpaid? If anything, the hiring of a somewhat bland and docile Dale Sveum is a sure sign that things on the field will be run from the front office, and not the dugout. And even with the bloated contracts of Zambrano and an aged Alfonso Soriano, the Cubs have room on the roster and payroll to make some huge off-season acquisitions. If Epstein wanted control, he's got it - now it's just a matter of what he will do with it. I, for one, will be watching.